In this paper, we investigate the determinants of political instability in Latin America. In a panel of 18 Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000, we find that democratic countries experience less average instability in the region, indicating that the move to increased democracy in the last couple decades may alleviate the persistent problem of instability in the area. We also find that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are important determinants of instability. Countries with low levels of inequality also suffer less instability on average, while ethnic diversity has a non-linear effect on instability. Many macroeconomic variables commonly thought to bring about political instability, such as inflation and high budget deficits, are not significantly correlated with instability in our sample. Only openness to trade has a significant negative effect on political instability. Only openness to trade has a significant negative effect on political instability *corresponding author JEL Codes: O11, O38, O15, 054
I. Introduction
Ranked as the third most unstable region in the world in the post-war era, political instability has been a pervasive problem in Latin America. 1 In our sample of 18 Latin
American countries from 1971-2000, there were 20 coups d'etat, 451 political assassinations, 217 riots, and 113 crises that threatened to bring down the sitting government. 2 Only three Latin American countries were consistently democratic over the thirty year period: Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela. 3 All of the rest of the countries switched from a democracy to an autocracy (or vice versa) at least once. In sum, political instability is a persistent and pernicious problem in the region. 4 Given the many studies that document the negative relationship between instability and capital accumulation (Alesina & Perotti (1996) ; Alesina et.al. (1996) ), it is likely that this instability has hampered economic development in the region. In this paper, we seek to uncover the factors behind this instability. In a
In this paper we analyze the determinants of political instability in a panel of 18
Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000. Not only is Latin America an interesting region to study because of it's unusually persistent problems with instability, but focusing on a small sample helps us to avoid potential problems with pooling data from a large set of very different countries. 5 We find three main interesting results: First, regime type is a significant determinant of instability in the area. Countries with higher democracy scores also have lower average political instability, which indicates that recent moves to increased democracy in the region may bring about less instability in the future. This result is tempered though by our finding that long lived democracies have a greater chance of experiencing instability than equally long lived autocracies. Second, we find that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are both important factors behind instability. Countries with low (or high) levels of inequality have less average instability than countries with average levels of inequality, and ethnic fractionalization has a nonlinear effect on political instability. Increases in ethnic fractionalization lower instability until a certain level of diversity, at which point any increases in diversity are associated with higher political instability. Third, we find that many of the macroeconomic variables included in our estimation (including the level and standard deviation of inflation and government budget deficit) are only weakly significant at best. Only lagged values of trade openness and investment are helpful in explaining current political instability.
Section II discusses why political instability is important to overall economic development, while section III investigates the determinants of instability. Section IV discusses the results of our estimation, and section V concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of our findings.
II. Why Political Instability Is Important
Political instability hinders economic development through its effect on the accumulation of physical and human capital. 6 Investments are often difficult to reverse, which means that investors will postpone new capital projects until the policy environment clarifies. 7 Pindyck & Solimano (1993) originally argued that economic instability, in the form of high inflation, is more damaging to new investment, than political instability. Since then, however, many other papers in the literature have found political instability to be equally harmful. Collier (1999) shows that under extreme cases of political instability, such as civil war, a country's existing capital stock will suffer from both the physical destruction and the general neglect during wartime. Investors will delay all new capital investments and either resort to purely speculative activities or move their money abroad. effect on per-capita income growth, and that one of the components of good governance is low political instability. 10 The reason for instability's inclusion in the definition of governance is that "the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the likelihood of wrenching changes in government, which not only has a direct effect on the continuity of policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of all citizens to peacefully select and replace those in power" (p. 177). They go on to argue that Latin American countries have low levels of governance in comparison to other regions of the world, and that the economic growth in the region has come without an improvement in governance. In the section below, we discuss our measure of political instability and some of the factors which may help to explain the prevalence of instability in the region.
III. An Empirical Model of Political Instability
We construct a measure of political instability using data from the Cross National Time Series Data (Banks (2005)). Because there are so many different types of instability, we begin by creating three categories of instability: the first includes all events which pose a major threat to the political and economic system at the national level such as coups, revolutions, and government crises; the second consists of events that reveal citizen discontent with the political system, such as general strikes, riots, and anti-government demonstrations; and the third includes extreme violent actions either by opposition elements or by the government in response to such opposition, such as guerilla warfare, assassinations, and purges. 11 We then sum, by category, the number of unstable events that occurred in each country over a 5 year period. As our three dimensions of political instability are likely to be highly correlated, we then take the principal component of these three categories as our measure of political instability.
12 Table 1 shows the average (and ranking) of our index of political instability for the individual countries in our sample, where larger numbers are associated with greater instability. Based on our measure of instability, the four most unstable countries are 
A. Democracy, Factionalism, and Regime Duration
Many studies highlight the importance of regime type to political stability.
Ellingsen (2000) and Parsa (2003) argue that democratic regimes tend to experience less political instability than undemocratic regimes because they allow citizens to participate in the political process. By allowing political participation, violence will be less likely to arise in democratic regimes because conflict can be solved through voting and consensus (Rummel (1995)). Auvinen (1997) and Przeworski & Limongi (1997) also point out that democracies divert resources from investment to consumption, which allows democratic regimes to provide more economic and political goods, thus alleviating deprivation and discontent.
Feng ( and stability, depending on the measure of stability. Specifically, she finds that countries with more democratic regimes are less likely to experience collective protests, but more likely to experience rebellions.
To measure democracy, we construct five-year averages of POLITY2, a variable obtained from the Polity IV Project. POLITY2 is equal to a country's democracy score less its autocracy score. Since the underlying variables range from 0 to 10, POLITY2 has a range of -10 and 10, where higher values represent stronger democracy. We also include two other regime measures. The first is a dummy variable that accounts for the presence of factionalism, where factionalism is defined by the Polity IV dataset as "polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas." 14 We take the average factional score for each five year period as a measure of particularist politics.
The second is a measure of regime durability and it is measured the year before each 5 year period. It is defined as the number of years that a country has not undergone a significant regime change, defined by the Polity IV as a 3 point move in a country's democracy score. Countries which have remained consistently democratic or autocratic during the sample may be less likely to experience a drastic change in regime. We also interact this with a democracy dummy which is equal to one when POLITY2 is greater than 0. In this way, we can also determine if durability matters across regime types.
B. Neighborhood Instability
Political instability can be contagious since revolutionary groups and ideologies can cross borders. Countries in "bad neighborhoods" might suffer from neighboring instability, especially if that instability causes a flood of refugees into the country or if guerilla armies use a country as a base from which to attack their home country.
Goldstone et.al. (2004) find that countries with four or more political unstable neighbors are more likely to experience political instability, while Schatzman (2005) finds that political instability in neighboring countries increases the probability of a country experiencing collective protests. 15 We create a variable that is equal to the number of neighbor countries that experienced political instability during each five-year period. We follow Goldstone et.al.'s approach and consider a country as politically unstable if there was either an ethnic conflict or a revolutionary war during the year, since these are the types of instability that are most likely to affect neighboring countries. Figure 1 illustrates the "bad neighborhoods" in Latin America and shows that countries in trouble tend to be clustered in the same region. There are two main blocs: the first is in Central America and includes Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; the second is in northwestern South America and includes Colombia and Peru. (2006), the elite will be against democracy in highly unequal societies because a democratic system will impose more redistributive policies. In addition, Perotti (1996) and Auvinen & Nafziger (2002) argue that an unequal distribution of income will produce social discontent, since individuals will perceive that income is unfairly distributed, leading to manifestations and uprisings. 16 Empirically, Alesina & Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), and Odedokun & Round (2001) show that countries with high income inequality are more likely to be politically unstable.
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To determine the effect of income inequality on the political environment, we create two dummy variables representing countries with high and low levels of income inequality. To create these dummy variables, we first calculated the mean of the Gini coefficient (from 1971 to 2000) for all the countries in the sample. 18 The high (low) inequality dummy variable is equal to one for those countries that have an average Gini coefficient of one standard deviation above (below) the sample mean. As shown in Table   1 , the most unequal countries in our sample are Guatemala, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. The least unequal are Paraguay, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Nicaragua. 19 It is interesting to note that, except the Dominican Republic, all of the highly unequal countries are also in the high instability sample. Likewise, two of the most politically stable countries also have the least amount of income inequality (Costa Rica and Paraguay).
D. Other socio-demographic conditions
Other variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, economic discrimination of While urbanization growth has also been considered in explanation of political instability, there is no consensus on how urbanization rates affect political instability.
For example, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) argue that the rate of urbanization is low during periods of instability, and that this negative relationship is due to the fact that a government has better military capability in a highly urbanized country than in a less urbanized country. With low urbanization rates, the population is dispersed and it is difficult for the government to contain instability. On the other hand, Auvinen (1997) and Annett (2000) argue that urbanization tends to promote more political instability.
High urbanization rates promote more instability because it is difficult for the government to provide basic services in highly populated cities, which creates popular discontent.
To investigate the effect of these socio-economic factors on instability, we include the number of years of the five year period in which there is at least one group that experiences economic discrimination, ethnic fractionalization (and its square), and the average urbanization growth rate for each five-year period.
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D. Macroeconomic factors
While the majority of papers on political instability investigate the effects of instability on growth or investment, several models study the possibility that economic variables help explain instability. Poor economic performance has been considered as a major cause of political instability for two reasons. First, when income is low (or falling), the opportunity cost for an individual to rise up, protest, or revolt is low To investigate the effects of macroeconomic variables on instability in the region, we include the share of investment as a percentage of GDP, the standard deviation of inflation (as a measure of inflation volatility), the share of the government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, and openness to trade. 25 All of these variables are constructed in five-year averages. However, since there may be a reverse causality issue between them and political instability, we use the first lag in each case.
IV. Results
In this section, we test in a panel of 18 Latin American countries whether the variables discussed above significantly influence political instability. We use Ordinary Least Squares and White robust standard errors for all estimations. Unless otherwise noted, all of the data is averaged into 5 year periods, allowing us to capture information from both average cross country differences and fluctuations over time.
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Column 1 of Table 5 presents our results and shows that the model explains 46 percent of the variation in the instability index. One of the most interesting results from column 1 is that the regime type and durability significantly affect instability levels in the region. The coefficient on POLITY2 is negative and significant at the .01 level, meaning that countries with higher levels of democracy in the five-year period have lower levels of instability on average. The quantitative effect of democracy is not quantitatively large; a one standard deviation increase in POLITY2 (equal to 6.09) is associated with a .36 point decrease in the political instability index (which is equal to almost one-third of a standard deviation).
The coefficient on the factional dummy is positive and significant at the 1 percent To determine the effect of regime durability on political instability, we also want to control for the possibility that different regime types may have different effects on political instability. For this reason, we include in our model an interaction term of the duration of a regime and a dummy equal to one for democratic countries. 27 We find that the coefficient on durability is negative and weakly significant, but that the interaction term is positive and significant at the .01 level. These results imply that new autocratic regimes are more likely to face political instability in the subsequent five-year period than more established ones.
Somewhat surprisingly, the results also indicate that older democracies also face higher instability levels than equally established autocracies. One possible reason for this finding is the fact that individuals in a democratic regime have more opportunity to express their discontent through non-violent demonstrations. Since our index of political instability includes demonstrations and strikes, our finding supports the view that under democracies the dynamic between the government and society may be different. the rest of the sample have diversity levels associated with higher levels of instability.
Income inequality also has an important affect on instability levels in the region.
The coefficients on the high and low inequality dummies are statistically negative and significant at the .01 level. Countries with low income inequality have an average of 1.07 points less on our index of political instability than countries with medium levels of inequality. Thus, the effect of low inequality is both statistically and quantitatively important (1.07 is close to one standard deviation in the instability index), supporting For robustness purposes, we re-estimate the model and exclude the variables that are not significant at least at the 10 percent level (neighborhood conflict, economic discrimination, the standard deviation of inflation, and the government deficit share). We perform an F test and find that we cannot reject (at the 5 percent level) the hypothesis that these variables as a group do not explain significantly political instability. Column 3 of Table 5 shows the results from this estimation. The results are almost identical to that of column 1, with the exceptions that the coefficient on ethnic fractionalization is now significant at the .05 level instead of the .10 level and the coefficient of the interaction term between the regime durability variable and the democracy dummy is now significant at the .05 level instead of the .01 level.
In addition, we re-estimate our model using a different measure of democracy.
Here we measure democracy as the five year average of the democracy score (DEMOC)
provided by the Polity IV dataset. The variable ranges from 0 to 10 and it measures the degree of openness of political institutions. 29 Like the POLITY2 variable, higher values of DEMOC are associated with higher levels of democracy. Using this new measure of democracy, column 2 of Table 5 shows the estimates of the full model. Column 4 of Table 5 shows the estimates of the restricted model that excludes those variables that are not significant as group based on the F test.
The results are very similar to the previous results. For example, the coefficient on democracy is negative and statistically significant at the .01 level. The coefficient on the democracy score indicates that an increase on democracy of one standard deviation (equal to 3.56) is associated with a .39 point decrease in the political instability index, which is very close to the estimate when we use the polity score (POLITY2) as a measure of democracy. Although results obtained from this estimation are very similar to previous results, there are some slight differences. The coefficient on factionalism becomes is now significant at .05 level instead of .01 level, ethnic fractionalization becomes significant at the .05 level instead of .10 level, and the investment share is now insignificantly different from zero.
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V. Discussion
In this paper, we investigate the main factors behind political instability in 18
Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000. We estimate a model of instability for the region, including variables such as regime type and durability, income inequality, ethnic diversity, ethnic discrimination, regional spillover effects, urbanization growth, and a host of macroeconomic variables. We find many interesting results.
First, we show that democracy and factionalism have a significant effect on political instability. Countries with strong democratic regimes suffer less political instability on average, while countries with factional regimes experience higher average political instability. In addition, we show that regime durability has a negative effect on instability, although long lived democracies are more vulnerable than long lived autocracies. These findings are important because they highlight the need to establish the institutions and policies to promote strong democracies in Latin American countries, and also the possibility of future research on regime durability and democracy in the region.
We also find that the low income inequality dummy has a significant negative effect on political instability, meaning that policies which promote a more equal distribution of income may have a side benefit of lowering overall political instability.
For instance, while the promotion of a more egalitarian society through taxation may not be feasible (or popular) in the region, policy-makers could promote income equality through education. Our estimates show that ethnic fractionalization is partly behind high political instability in Latin America, and that highly fractionalized countries will tend to experience more political instability. This highlights the importance of establishing institutions that incorporate individuals from diverse ethnic groups in the political process with the purpose to promote more stability.
The demographic composition of a country is also important, since more urbanization seems to be associated with lower levels of political instability. Policies related to urbanizing and incorporating rural regions into to the national economy can also be used to promote stability in the region. Lastly, while many of the macroeconomic variables were insignificantly related to instability, we show that openness to trade is negatively and significantly associated with political instability.
Although Latin American countries have already significantly decreased their barriers to international trade, these results suggest that further trade liberalization will promote more political stability in the region. General Strike "Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority."
Guerrilla Warfare "Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime."
Government Crisis "Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime -excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow."
Purge "Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition."
Riot "Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force." Revolution "Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government."
Anti-Government Demonstration "Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature." Tables 6.2 . The government deficit was estimated using data provided by the Oxford Latin American Economic History Database (OXLAD). See Table 2 for an explanation of how government deficit as share of GDP was constructed.
